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General Douglas
MacArthur’s “Old Soldiers Never Die” Farewell
Address to Congress
NOTE: General
Douglas MacArthur, hero of two world wars, once again
answered the call to duty (in his seventies), leading
United States and United Nations forces in the Korean
War. His victory at Inchon secured his legend as one
of the greatest military commanders in history.
However, after communist China entered the war on behalf
of North Korea, MacArthur's request to take the war into
China was refused by President Harry Truman. As
Congress began deliberating on whether to back the
general's plan, President Truman removed the general from
command. Upon his return to the United States,
MacArthur was invited to address a joint session of
Congress. He prophetically foretold of communism's
spread to Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos), as well
as China's encroachment of Tibet. (Also note that
Taiwan was called Formosa at that time.) This speech
is considered one of most memorable orations made on the
floor of Congress.
April 19, 1951
Mr. President, Mr.
Speaker, and Distinguished Members of the Congress:
I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility
and great pride -- humility in the wake of those great
American architects of our history who have stood here
before me; pride in the reflection that this forum of
legislative debate represents human liberty in the
purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes and
aspirations and faith of the entire human race. I do not
stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the
issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm
of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the
highest plane of national interest if our course is to
prove sound and our future protected. I trust,
therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving
that which I have to say as solely expressing the
considered viewpoint of a fellow American.
I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the
fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind:
to serve my country. The issues are global and so
interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector,
oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster
for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the
Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the
Gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one
cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. There are
those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on
both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can
think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a
potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts,
it is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat
is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector
threatens the destruction of every other sector. You can
not appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia
without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt
its advance in Europe.
Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall
confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia.
Before one may objectively assess the situation now
existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's
past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her
course up to the present. Long exploited by the
so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to
achieve any degree of social justice, individual
dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our
own noble administration in the Philippines, the peoples
of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to
throw off the shackles of colonialism and now see the
dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity,
and the self-respect of political freedom.
Mustering half of the earth's population, and 60 percent
of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly
consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with
which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations
of the design of modern progress to their own distinct
cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the
concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of
Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a
corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers
as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back
toward the area whence it started.
In this situation, it becomes vital that our own country
orient its policies in consonance with this basic
evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind
to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the
Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free
destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance,
understanding, and support -- not imperious direction --
the dignity of equality and not the shame of
subjugation. Their pre-war standard of life, pitifully
low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in
war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian
thinking and are little understood. What the peoples
strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in
their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs,
a little firmer roof over their heads, and the
realization of the normal nationalist urge for political
freedom. These political-social conditions have but an
indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do
form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be
thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls
of unrealism.
Of more direct and immediately bearing upon our national
security are the changes wrought in the strategic
potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past
war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the
United States lay on the literal line of the Americas,
with an exposed island salient extending out through
Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That
salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue
of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack.
The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any
predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering
land areas. All this was changed by our Pacific victory.
Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the
entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to
protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a
protective shield for all of the Americas and all free
lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the
shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc
from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us and our
free allies. From this island chain we can dominate with
sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to
Singapore -- with sea and air power every port, as I
said, from Vladivostok to Singapore -- and prevent any
hostile movement into the Pacific.
*Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious
effort.* No amphibious force can be successful without
control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in
its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and
modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack
from continental Asia toward us or our friends in the
Pacific would be doomed to failure.
Under such conditions, the Pacific no longer represents
menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader.
It assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful
lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be
maintained with a minimum of military effort and
expense. It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does
it provide the bastions essential for offensive
operations, but properly maintained, would be an
invincible defense against aggression. The holding of
this literal defense line in the western Pacific is
entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof;
for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power
would render vulnerable to determined attack every other
major segment.
This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to
find a military leader who will take exception. For that
reason, I have strongly recommended in the past, as a
matter of military urgency, that under no circumstances
must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an
eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the
Philippines and the loss of Japan and might well force
our western frontier back to the coast of California,
Oregon and Washington.
To understand the changes which now appear upon the
Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in
Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years.
China, up to 50 years ago, was completely
non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided
against each other. The war-making tendency was almost
non-existent, as they still followed the tenets of the
Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the
century, under the regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts
toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a
nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully
developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but
has been brought to its greatest fruition under the
present regime to the point that it has now taken on the
character of a united nationalism of increasingly
dominant, aggressive tendencies.
Through these past 50 years the Chinese people have thus
become militarized in their concepts and in their
ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers, with
competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new
and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes,
is allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own
concepts and methods has become aggressively
imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased
power normal to this type of imperialism.
There is little of the ideological concept either one
way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of
living is so low and the capital accumulation has been
so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are
desperate and eager to follow any leadership which seems
to promise the alleviation of local stringencies.
I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese
Communists' support of the North Koreans was the
dominant one. Their interests are, at present, parallel
with those of the Soviet. But I believe that the
aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but
also in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially
toward the South reflects predominantly the same lust
for the expansion of power which has animated every
would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.
The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the
greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a
commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked
capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left
in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to
the supremacy of individual liberty and personal
dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been
created a truly representative government committed to
the advance of political morality, freedom of economic
enterprise, and social justice.
Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now
abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not
again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted
upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the
course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent
manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent
challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them
from the outside and checked communism within their own
frontiers without the slightest slackening in their
forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation
divisions to the Korean battlefront without the
slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power
vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith.
I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and
industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be
entertained for future constructive service in the
advance of the human race.
Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can look forward
in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected
and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer
aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be
patient and understanding and never fail them -- as in
our hour of need, they did not fail us. A Christian
nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of
Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high
moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.
On Formosa, the government of the Republic of China has
had the opportunity to refute by action much of the
malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its
leadership on the Chinese mainland. The Formosan people
are receiving a just and enlightened administration with
majority representation on the organs of government, and
politically, economically, and socially they appear to
be advancing along sound and constructive lines.
With this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I
now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not
consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene
in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from
a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we hurled
back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory
was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red
China intervened with numerically superior ground
forces.
This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a
situation not contemplated when our forces were
committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation
which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere
to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.
Such decisions have not been forthcoming.
While no man in his right mind would advocate sending
our ground forces into continental China, and such was
never given a thought, the new situation did urgently
demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our
political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had
defeated the old.
Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize
the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the
Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of
the war made necessary: first the intensification of our
economic blockade against China; two the imposition of a
naval blockade against the China coast; three removal of
restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal
areas and of Manchuria; four removal of restrictions on
the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with
logistical support to contribute to their effective
operations against the common enemy.
For entertaining these views, all professionally
designed to support our forces committed to Korea and
bring hostilities to an end with the least possible
delay and at a saving of countless American and allied
lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles,
principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a
military standpoint the above views have been fully
shared in the past by practically every military leader
concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I called for reinforcements but was informed that
reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if
not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north
of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly
Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not
permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the
Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if
there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the
position of the command from the military standpoint
forbade victory.
We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an
approximate area where our supply line advantages were
in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the
enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive
campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon
our forces if the enemy utilized its full military
potential. I have constantly called for the new
political decisions essential to a solution.
Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has
been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger. Nothing
could be further from the truth. I know war as few other
men now living know it, and nothing to me is more
revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition,
as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has
rendered it useless as a means of settling international
disputes. Indeed, on the second day of September,
nineteen hundred and forty-five, just following the
surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship
Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:
"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace.
Various methods through the ages have been attempted to
devise an international process to prevent or settle
disputes between nations. From the very start workable
methods were found in so far as individual citizens were
concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of
larger international scope have never been successful.
Military alliances, balances of power, Leagues of
Nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be
by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness
of war now blocks out this alternative. We have had our
last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more
equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The
problem basically is theological and involves a
spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human
character that will synchronize with our almost
matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all
material and cultural developments of the past 2000
years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the
flesh."
But once war is forced upon us, there is no other
alternative than to apply every available means to bring
it to a swift end.
War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.
In war there is no substitute for victory.
There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease
Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for
history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that
appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points
to no single instance where this end has justified that
means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham
peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and
successively greater demands until, as in blackmail,
violence becomes the only other alternative.
"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military
advantages to an enemy in the field?" I could not
answer.
Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an
all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet
intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China
is already engaging with the maximum power it can
commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its
actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will
more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity
in military or other potential is in its favor on a
world-wide basis.
The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact
that its military action is confined to its territorial
limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose
to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval
and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are
fully protected from such attack and devastation.
Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is
the sole one which has risked its all against communism.
The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the
Korean people defies description.
They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery.
Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the
Pacific!"
I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have
met all tests there, and I can report to you without
reservation that they are splendid in every way.
It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this
savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of
time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing
bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety.
Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and
in my prayers always.
I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I
joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it
was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and
dreams. The world has turned over many times since I
took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes
and dreams have long since vanished, but I still
remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack
ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that
"old soldiers never die; they just fade away."
And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my
military career and just fade away, an old soldier who
tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see
that duty.
Good Bye.
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